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I 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past seventy years, arbitration has been closely linked to the resolu-
tion of labor disputes.1  Courts have consistently upheld labor arbitration 
agreements, usually included in collective bargaining agreements (CBAs), 
because they are the result of negotiations between parties of equal bargaining 
strength.2  More recently, however, employers have attempted to use mandatory 
arbitration to handle disputes relating to individual employees’ statutory rights 
under such laws as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,3 the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),4 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA).5  This use of mandatory arbitration has been the subject of ongoing 
scrutiny by the courts and commentators because it attempts to use arbitration 
as a substitute for the courts rather than as the final step of a grievance proce-
dure.6 
As arbitration processes have improved over the last ten years, the negative 
perception of mandatory arbitration provisions that apply to statutory claims 
has decreased.  The case law reflects this change in perception, as courts now 
allow mandatory arbitration of statutory claims brought by nonunion employ-
ees.  Nonetheless, the almost universal rejection of mandatory arbitration of 
statutory claims in the collective bargaining context continues.  This Article 
argues that this continued distinction between claims by union and nonunion 
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 1. Disputes relating to wages, schedules, seniority, and work rules are usually settled exclusively 
through the grievance procedures found in collective bargaining agreements, which culminate in arbi-
tration. 
 2. Morton H. Orenstein, Mandatory Arbitration: Alive and Well or Withering on a Vine?,  1999 J. 
DISP. RESOL.  57, 58. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e15 (2000). 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2000). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2000). 
 6. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that an employee 
subject to a collective bargaining agreement requiring the arbitration of all disputes is not precluded 
from bringing a Title VII claim in federal court). 
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employees lacks any meaningful justification—that is, that mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory claims is as appropriate, if not more so, in the collective bar-
gaining context as it is in the nonunionized workplace. 
Part II of the Article describes the impact of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver 
Co.,7 the case that remains the precedent for denying unions the right to agree 
to enforceable mandatory arbitration provisions.  Part III explores the changing 
mentality of the courts regarding mandatory arbitration provisions in individual 
employment contracts.  Part IV clarifies the distinction between individual 
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims and similar provisions in CBAs and 
contends that it is a distinction with too little difference to justify disparate 
treatment by the courts.  Part V discusses some recent decisions in which courts 
have, in fact, rejected this distinction.  Finally, Part VI outlines how employers 
and unions can draft arbitration provisions to increase their likelihood of being 
upheld in the courts. 
II 
GARDNER-DENVER AS THE STARTING POINT 
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court held that an 
employee does not lose his right to sue under Title VII when he is part of a col-
lective bargaining agreement requiring arbitration of all disputes.  In its analy-
sis, the Court distinguished between contractual and statutory rights.8  While 
contractual rights are conferred upon employees as a collective, and thus can be 
bargained away for the benefit of the group,9 statutory rights are conferred 
upon the individual and are therefore subject to waiver only on an individual 
basis.  In other words, Title VII rights to equal and fair employment opportuni-
ties can be waived only by the person who holds them—the individual worker.10  
The Court also recognized that Congress intended through Title VII to make 
eliminating discrimination one of the nation’s highest priorities.11  Therefore, 
the Court held, while arbitration may be appropriate for contractual disputes, 
an employee’s statutory rights under Title VII should not be forfeited by an 
agreement between his employer and his union.12 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 51.  The Court concluded that the submission of a claim to one forum did not foreclose its 
subsequent submission to another.  No inconsistency results from permitting both rights—contractual 
and statutory—to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums simply because the dispute 
stems from the same factual occurrence. 
 9. A union can lawfully waive certain collective rights of the employees it represents, including 
the right to strike during the term of a CBA and the right to refuse to cross a lawful picket line.  See, 
e.g., NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (holding that a union may waive an 
employee’s right to strike).  However, a union cannot waive employees’ right to choose a collective 
bargaining representative under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).  
NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tenn., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). 
 10. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51. 
 11. Id. at 46. 
 12. Id. at 51. 
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In addition to distinguishing between contractual and statutory rights, the 
Court expressed a number of concerns with the arbitration process as it applies 
to statutory claims.  For example, the Court was concerned that union members 
do not have the opportunity to give individual consent to CBAs and that unions 
ultimately control access to CBA-mandated arbitration.13  The Court also sug-
gested that the fact-finding process used in arbitration is not equivalent to the 
judicial fact-finding process.14  Moreover, in arbitration, the record is not as 
complete as it would be in judicial proceedings, “the usual rules of evidence do 
not apply[,] and rights and procedures that are common to civil trials, such as 
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, 
are often severely limited or unavailable.”15  The Court further refuted the 
notion that arbitral processes are equal to judicial processes by pointing out that 
an arbitrator is required to interpret the CBA to give effect to the parties’ 
intent, not to the governing law.  Therefore, when the CBA conflicts with the 
law, the arbitrator is bound to follow the former.16 
III 
DIFFERENT TIMES OR A DIFFERENT CONTEXT?  
THE MITSUBISHI TRILOGY, GILMER, AND CIRCUIT CITY 
In the two decades following Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., as the 
courts’ backlog with employment discrimination claims grew, they began 
increasingly to accept the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in individual 
employment contracts.  In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a trilogy of 
opinions allowing employers to require arbitration of claims arising under the 
Sherman Act,17 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),18 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19  In Mitsubishi Motors v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the first case in the trilogy, the Court held that 
even if arbitration is not always appropriate, parties should be held to their 
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims unless Congress has made clear its 
intention to prevent the waiver of judicial remedies.20  The Court ruled that nei-
ther the inadequacy of, nor the inherent mistrust in, the arbitration process 
weighs against enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements.  As the Court 
explained: “We are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability 
 
 13. Id. at 58 n.19. 
 14. Id. at 56. 
 15. Id. at 57-58. 
 16. Id. at 57. 
 17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985) (finding 
that the complexity of an antitrust case does not bar arbitration when the parties have agreed to arbi-
trate all disputes). 
 18. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (concluding that Congress 
did not intend to prevent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate RICO claims). 
 19. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (holding that the 
use of arbitration does not undermine any of the substantive rights afforded under the Act). 
 20. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 630-32. 
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of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the devel-
opment of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”21 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,22 the Court held for the first time 
that an agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment discrimination claim is 
enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).23  Starting with the 
presumption that the dispute was arbitrable under the individual employment 
agreement, the Court then searched the language and history of the underlying 
statute, the ADEA, for anything that might overcome this presumption.24  The 
Court concluded that “by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does 
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; [he] merely submits 
their resolution to an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”25  “So long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate his statutory cause of action in the 
arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent 
function.”26 
In the wake of Gilmer, the courts have generally held that a nonunion 
employee can be compelled to submit an employment-related claim to arbitra-
tion pursuant to a predispute arbitration agreement.27  For example, in Circuit 
City Stores v. Adams, the Court upheld a mandatory arbitration clause in an 
individual employment agreement purporting to cover an employment dis-
crimination claim arising under state law.28  In so holding, the Court affirmed 
Gilmer and reiterated the benefits of arbitration in the employment context, 
ruling that the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses in individual 
employment contracts is consistent with the pro-arbitration purposes of the 
FAA. 
IV 
IS THERE (OR SHOULD THERE BE) A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE  
UNIONIZED AND NONUNIONIZED WORKPLACE IN  
THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS? 
The Court in Gilmer did not overrule Gardner-Denver.  Instead it distin-
guished the two cases, in part on the ground that Gilmer involved an individu-
ally signed employment agreement, while Gardner-Denver involved a collective 
 
 21. Id. at 626-27. 
 22. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). 
 24. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 25. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985)) (brackets omitted). 
 26. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
 27. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1998); 
Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouse, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 313-14 (6th Cir. 2000); Kuenher v. Dickinson & 
Co., 84 F.3d  316 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 28. 532 U.S. at 113. 
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bargaining agreement ratified by the employee’s union.29  For the most part, the 
Supreme Court and lower courts have continued to accept this distinction. 30  In 
doing so, they point out that unionized employees do not have individual input 
into union arbitration policy, that the union decides which cases to take to arbi-
tration and how to present them, that labor arbitrators do not have the experi-
ence or authority to decide statutory claims, and that there is no federal policy 
supporting mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the collective bargain-
ing context.31  However, a review of these purported distinctions shows that 
arguments supporting arbitration for individual but not unionized employees 
are misguided; any differences between the two types of workplaces suggest 
that mandatory arbitration should be favored in the union setting as much as, if 
not more than, the individual employment setting. 
A.  Power to Consent 
The majority of courts and scholars oppose the inclusion of mandatory arbi-
tration clauses in CBAs because employees, who are not actual parties to a 
CBA,32 do not individually consent to any arbitration provision within it.  These 
critics argue further that unions may not adopt arbitration procedures that are 
favorable to all employees.33 
A union is not required to submit a proposed CBA to its membership for 
ratification before agreeing to it.  In fact, the members do not even have the 
 
 29. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.  The other grounds for the Court’s distinction were (1) that Gardner-
Denver “did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims,” 
but instead “the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subse-
quent judicial resolution of statutory claims,” and (2) that Gardner-Denver was not decided under the 
FAA.”  Id. 
 30. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that “in a § 1983 action, 
a federal court should not afford res judicata or collateral-estoppel to effect an award in an arbitration 
proceeding brought pursuant to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement”); Barrentine v. Arkan-
sas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that a CBA-based arbitration decision does not 
preclude a subsequent suit based on the same underlying facts alleging a violation of the minimum 
wage provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 
761 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court’s opinions and scholarly commentary have cogently pointed 
out the inherent differences in purpose, structure, and methodology between labor and commercial 
arbitration.  In fact, the disparities are so great that they largely explain the difference in attitude of the 
Supreme Court in permitting only discretionary deference to labor arbitration awards under LMRA 
collective bargaining agreements . . . in Title VII actions, while allowing ADEA claims to be subjected 
to compulsory arbitration under the FAA pursuant to a prospective pre-employment arbitration 
agreement.”) (citations omitted); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding 
squarely that CBAs cannot be used to “compel an employee to arbitrate a claim that he may have 
under one of the federal statutes . . . that confer litigable rights on employees”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 
912 (1997); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Web-
ster Eng’g Corp., 117 F.3d 519 (11th Cir. 1997); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 608 (6th Cir. 
1997); Varner v. Nat’l Supermarkets., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Harvey R. Boller & 
Donald J. Petersen, Job Discrimination Claims Under Collective Bargaining, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 38, 39 
(1998) (providing a summary of where the circuits stand on the issue). 
 31. See, e.g., City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. at 290-91. 
 32. See Loss v. Blankenship, 673 F.2d 942, 947 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 33. See, e.g., Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742 (discussing reasons why a mandatory arbitration clause in a 
collective bargaining agreement might cause an employee to lose the rights to a minimum wage and 
overtime pay). 
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right to see the agreement in advance, to comment on it, or to vote on it.  Indi-
vidual union members may not even be aware that the CBA has waived their 
rights and protections under Title VII, the ADA, and other statutes.34  In addi-
tion, while the majority of the membership may have selected the union, the 
union’s decisions impact all of the workers in the union, including those who did 
not choose that particular union or want any union at all.35  In Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,36 the Supreme Court recognized that a 
union’s objective is to maximize overall compensation of its members, not to 
ensure that each individual employee receives the best deal available.  Thus, a 
union must balance individual interests against collective interests and may act 
in ways that negatively affect individual employees while benefiting the unit as 
a whole.37 
While these concerns are valid, they do not justify an across-the-board rule 
treating union and individual arbitration agreements differently.  As long as a 
union employee is made aware of the details of the arbitration provision at the 
time the CBA is adopted, he has the same choice as an individual employee—
accept the provision as written or find another job.  Neither union nor 
individual employees have the opportunity to directly comment on the 
arbitration agreements to which they are held. 
In fact, arbitration provisions in CBAs are likely to be more employee-
friendly than similar provisions that apply to individual employees because 
union employees, though their elected representatives, have a more realistic 
opportunity to consent to the mandatory arbitration policies to which they are 
held.  Employees in nonunion workplaces have less bargaining power than 
unionized workers and are therefore less likely to be able to give true consent 
to take-it-or-leave-it clauses.38  As one commentator states: 
[T]he notion that [nonunion] employees sit down at the bargaining table with their 
employers and hammer out their own, personalized employment contract is an illu-
sion.  An overwhelming majority of these workers are never given the opportunity to 
personalize their employment contracts in any way.  Rather, the non-union, at-will 
workplace is governed not by individualized employment agreements, but by form 
contracts, employment manuals, and clauses in job applications, all of which include 
the terms of employment set forth by the employer.  It is within these “agreements” 
where clauses mandating the arbitration of statutory claims are likely to be found.39 
 
 34. Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit’s 
Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 123, 151 (1998). 
 35. Johnson v. Bodine Elec. Co., 142 F.3d 363, 365 (7th Cir. 1998); see Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. 
Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 876 (1998) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract[,] and a party cannot be required 
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”) (citing United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 682 (1960)). 
 36. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
 37. Id. at 742. 
 38. See Daniel Roy, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union Workplace After 
Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 74 IND. L.J. 1347, 1359-61 (1999) (discussing the realities 
of how nonunion employees agree to mandatory arbitration clauses). 
 39. Id. at 1359-60. 
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Individual employees’ lack of bargaining power when compared that of 
union members draws into question the relevance of the Gilmer Court’s distinc-
tion between union and nonunion arbitration agreements. The arbitration pro-
vision at issue in Gardner-Denver was negotiated by the employer and the 
union selected by a majority of the plaintiff’s co-workers.  The union, like the 
employer, was likely a repeat player “with an equivalent insight into arbitration 
and the operations of the workplace,”40 and with the experience and knowledge 
necessary to draft a fair arbitration agreement.  By comparison, the individual 
employee in Gilmer had to sign a contract in which he had little, if any, input.41  
If the Court were to enforce the arbitration clause in either of the two cases, it 
should have enforced the one in Gardner-Denver. 
B.  Authority of the Arbitrator 
Courts also oppose mandatory arbitration in the union workplace because 
labor arbitrators have traditionally had only the authority to decide disputes 
based on the language of the contract at issue, not on the applicable law.42  
Admittedly, the standard arbitration provision found in most CBAs states that 
the provision covers only disputes between the parties as to the meaning, inter-
pretation, and application of the provisions of the particular agreement.43  This 
tradition, however, is no basis for an across-the-board rule.  The traditional 
provision can simply be reworded to give labor arbitrators the power to also 
resolve statutory claims. 
C. Lack of Federal Authority 
Opponents of mandatory arbitration in the union context also argue that no 
federal policy favors including mandatory arbitration clauses in collective bar-
gaining agreements.44  Gilmer and its progeny were decided under the FAA. 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to counteract the federal courts’ aversion to 
arbitration agreements.45  The Act gives arbitration agreements the same legal 
standing as other contracts46 and preempts any state law that would allow an 
 
 40. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective Bargaining Context, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 491, 506 (2001) (discussing whether union-management arbitration can effectively enforce 
employee rights against discrimination). 
 41. The agreement involved in Gilmer not even an employment contract but instead a New York 
Stock Exchange registration application that Gilmer’s employer required him to sign as a condition of 
his employment.  See Gilmer v.  Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991); cf. St. Antoine, 
supra note 40, at 491 (stating that nonunion employees sign what amounts to a contract of adhesion). 
 42. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974). 
 43. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 565 (1960). 
 44. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991); see Harrison v. Eddy Potash, 
Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the court has “previously concluded that [the 
FAA exclusion] encompasses collective bargaining agreements, and ha[s] thus held the FAA is gener-
ally inapplicable to labor arbitration”). 
 45. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. 
 46. Id. 
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employee to litigate all statutory claims despite an agreement to arbitrate.47  
Critics claim that the FAA does not govern CBAs because they are among the 
employment contracts excluded from the scope of the Act.48  The Supreme 
Court, however, weakened this argument when it held, in Circuit City Stores v. 
Adams, 49 that the FAA excludes employment contracts only in industries that 
are directly involved in interstate commerce, such as transportation.  After Cir-
cuit City, a strong argument can be made that the FAA and its national policy 
favoring arbitration applies to all CBAs in industries not directly involved in 
interstate commerce. 
D.  Union Control Over Which Cases to Arbitrate 
The strongest barrier to the overturning of Gardner-Denver and the 
union/nonunion distinction is the tradition of union control over entry into the 
arbitration process.  While arbitration in the individual employment context is 
merely the substitution of a different forum,50 under traditional CBAs, “the 
union has broad discretion whether or not to prosecute a grievance.”51  Thus, if 
the union decides not to arbitrate, the employee has lost altogether his right to 
bring a claim.52 
However, arguments relying on this aspect of CBA-mandated arbitration 
underestimate the impact of the unions’ duty of fair representation, which gives 
unions an incentive to take meritorious claims to arbitration.53  It requires them 
to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination, to exer-
cise their discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbi-
trary conduct.54  Furthermore, because defending even one lawsuit for breach of 
 
 47. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempts all state 
laws that single out and “undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements” covered by the Act). 
 48. See, e.g., Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]his court 
has held that collective bargaining agreements are ‘contracts of employment’ and therefore outside the 
scope of the FAA.”) (citing Bacashihua v. United States Postal Serv., 859 F.2d 402, 404-05 (6th Cir. 
1988)). 
 49. 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001). 
 50. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). 
 51. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 912 
(1997); see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967); Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims 
in the Unionized Workplace: Is Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
513, 533-534 (2001) (arguing that while individual arbitration might be merely the substitution of a dif-
ferent forum, arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is different because the union con-
trols the arbitration process). 
 52. See, e.g., Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978, 983 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (finding that an 
employee was precluded from bringing his disability discrimination claim because of an arbitration 
agreement, even though his union never arbitrated the issue of disability discrimination). 
 53. Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee’s Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What 
Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 260-61 (1977) (explaining that the Court in 
Vaca had “emphasized that the union’s exclusive control over grievance procedures did not carry with 
it ‘unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract’”) (quoting 
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186)); see Roy, supra note 38, at 1367.  See generally Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (docu-
menting the development of the duty of fair representation). 
 54. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (inferring from the powers of 
the union as the exclusive bargaining representative under the Railroad Labor Act a duty to represent 
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the duty of fair representation costs much more than multiple arbitrations, 
unions have an incentive to take even borderline cases to arbitration.55 
The duty of fair representation does not require unions to arbitrate every 
case that comes before them.56  Unions traditionally have broad discretion and 
therefore may, for example, choose not to pursue a claim in which the conflict 
involves two or more union members (such as when one employee makes a 
sexual harassment claim against another).57  In addition, a union may have lim-
ited financial resources, leaving it unable to pursue a claim because of monetary 
constraints.58  A union may also decide not to pursue a claim because it ques-
tions the validity of the employee’s claim.59 
One solution would be to incorporate into CBAs provisions allowing 
employees to take their claims to arbitration individually when the union 
chooses not to pursue a claim, perhaps bearing their own expenses in doing so.60  
This solution might be difficult to implement because unions might resist relin-
quishing their influence over the grievance procedure and employer-employee 
interactions.  However, even if employers and unions cannot agree to imple-
ment such a solution, union control of access to arbitration does not alone sup-
port the distinction between mandatory arbitration provisions in individual 
employment agreements and those in collective bargaining agreements. 
V 
CLOSING THE GAP: AUSTIN, WRIGHT,  . . . 
Since Gilmer was decided, a few courts have recognized that there is little 
reason to distinguish between mandatory arbitration provisions in individual 
employment contracts and those in collective bargaining agreements.  In 1996, 
in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,61 the Fourth Circuit 
rejected any absolute ban on mandatory arbitration of statutory claims in the 
collective bargaining context.  The court noted the strong federal policy favor-
ing arbitration of labor disputes and thus rejected the distinction between CBAs 
 
all employees within the bargaining unit “without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good 
faith”); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1955) (inferring the same obligation 
under the NLRA). 
 55. Roy, supra note 38, at 1364 (discussing unions’ incentives to take cases to arbitration).  In cases 
in which the union does breach the duty of fair representation, the employee can sue the union for its 
breach, and the union might then be subjected to multiple proceedings to enforce the same right—the 
suit for the breach, the arbitration, and a subsequent appeal.  See Pryner, 109 F.3d at 362. 
 56. Michael P. Wolf, Give ‘Em Their Day in Court: An Argument Against Collective Bargaining 
Agreements Mandating Arbitration to Resolve Employee Statutory Claims, 56 J. MO. BUS. 263, 268 
(2000) (stating that unions are empowered to determine which cases they will ultimately pursue, so long 
as they exercise their decisionmaking power “without hostility, discrimination or arbitrariness”) (quot-
ing Hodges, supra note 34, at 145). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See infra Part VI.C. 
 61. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996). 
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that require arbitration and individual agreements to arbitrate.62  The Fourth 
Circuit’s analysis focused on the Gilmer Court’s noting the similarities between 
individuals and unions in the arbitration context 63 and its acceptance of arbitra-
tion as an alternative, rather than an inferior, forum.64  The court in Austin also 
accepted the employer’s argument that the real distinction between the cases 
adhering to Gardner-Denver and those following Gilmer is the radical change 
over the past two decades in the Court’s receptivity to arbitration.65 
Although no other circuit has explicitly adopted the Fourth Circuit’s rea-
soning, enough uncertainty had arisen to persuade the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,66 which offered the 
Court an opportunity to clarify the reasons for distinguishing between individ-
ual employment agreements to arbitrate and arbitration clauses found in CBAs.  
Wright was a member of a union whose collective bargaining contract contained 
a clause that provided for the arbitration of all disputes “affecting wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment.”67  When several employers 
under contract with the union refused to hire him because he had previously 
claimed permanent disability, he filed suit in federal district court, alleging that 
the employers’ refusal to hire violated the ADA.  The employers countered that 
Wright was bound to arbitrate his claims. 
Unfortunately, the Court refused to resolve whether Gilmer rejected the 
absolute prohibition of a union’s waiver of employees’ statutory rights to a fed-
eral forum.68  Instead, the Court ruled even assuming that a CBA arbitration 
clause waiving federal forum rights would be enforceable, the clause at issue did 
not clearly enough express such a waiver.  Holding the CBA to a higher stan-
dard than that set for individual employment agreements, the Court concluded 
that this general clause did not constitute a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of 
Wright’s statutory rights and therefore did not preclude his suit.69  The Court 
also confirmed that, contrary to the rule established in Gilmer for individual 
employment contracts, statutory claims are never presumed to be arbitrable 
under a CBA because the courts are in a better position than arbitrators to 
interpret disputes arising under federal law.70 
The decision in Wright protects against unclear waivers, but it does not 
completely ban prospective, union-negotiated waivers of federal forum rights.71  
This flexibility opens the door for the lower courts to decide whether claims 
 
 62. Id. at 879. 
 63. Id. at 885. 
 64. Id. at 880. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 525 U.S. 70 (1998). 
 67. Id. at 73. 
 68. Id. at 76-77. 
 69. Id. at 80-81. 
 70. Id. at 77. 
 71. Michelle Hartmann, Comment, A Myriad of Contradiction with Title VII Arbitration Agree-
ments—Duffield as the Past, Austin as the Future, and the EEOC as the Target of Restructuring, 54 
SMU L. REV. 359, 376 (2001). 
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under Title VII and other statutes are subject to binding arbitration provisions 
found in CBAs.  The Eastern District of New York seized this opportunity in 
Clarke v. UFI, Inc.72  The CBA at issue in Clark incorporated Title VII’s provi-
sion on sexual harassment and expressly charged the arbitrator to resolve 
disputes over whether that statute had been violated.  The court concluded that 
the provision met the clear-and-unmistakable standard and ruled that the plain-
tiff was bound by the provision.73  Likewise, the Middle District of North Caro-
lina, in Safrit v. Cone Mills, found that the CBA at issue contained a valid 
waiver. 74  The court described the CBA as “an agreement not to discriminate 
against any employee because of gender and to abide by Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.”75 
VI 
THE UNIONIZED WORKPLACE:  
CAN ARBITRATION BE MANDATORY OR NOT? 
Despite the opening created by Wright, few courts thus far have enforced 
mandatory arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements 
against statutory employment claims.  Employers therefore must draft manda-
tory arbitration provisions purporting to apply to statutory claims carefully if 
they hope to have them upheld in the courts. 
A. Incorporation of Statutory Claims 
To meet the clear-and-unmistakable standard imposed by Wright, the CBA 
must explicitly state that employees are required to submit all causes of action 
arising out of their employment to arbitration, and it must also list the individ-
ual federal statutes covered under the arbitration clause, including the nondis-
crimination clause.76  An alternative format for writing the CBA is to include 
both a nondiscrimination clause and an arbitration clause that clearly applies to 
all provisions of the contract, including the nondiscrimination clause.77  How-
ever, neither a general anti-discrimination requirement nor contractual lan-
guage that parallels—or even parrots—the relevant anti-discrimination statutes 
is sufficient to establish a waiver in the Fourth Circuit,78 the circuit most likely to 
enforce a mandatory arbitration provision.  In addition, it is insufficient to 
 
 72. 98 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 73. Id. at 335. 
 74. No. 4:97 CV00646, 1999 WL 1111516, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 1999) (mem.). 
 75. Id. at *1.  Section XX of the CBA required that any grievance for discrimination be submitted 
to arbitration.  Id. 
 76. Roy, supra note 38, at 1373 (outlining language meeting the “clear and unmistakable” standard 
developed in Wright). 
 77. Jennifer A Naber & Joseph M. Gagliardo, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Law 
Claims, in 29TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 2000, at 43, 67 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac-
tice Course, Handbook Series No. 638, 2000). 
 78. See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the arbitra-
tion of statutory discrimination claims is required only if a CBA clearly includes the relevant anti-dis-
crimination statute). 
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merely state in the CBA that the parties have agreed not to discriminate in 
violation of the law.  Instead, the language must clearly state that the federal 
anti-discrimination statutes have been incorporated into the agreement.79 
B. Design of the Arbitration Procedure 
When designing or negotiating procedures that will apply to statutory 
claims, employers should consider incorporating certain features.  The Ameri-
can Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, and the 
United States Department of Labor’s Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations have recommended: (1) providing the parties with 
access to simple discovery; (2) requiring the arbitrator to prepare a written 
opinion and award; (3) outlining a cost-sharing plan that ensures arbitrator neu-
trality but is not cost-prohibitive for the employee; (4) providing for joint selec-
tion of a neutral arbitrator; (5) providing for limited judicial review of the arbi-
trator’s application of the law; (6) permitting the arbitrator to award remedies 
equal to those provided by the law; and (7) allowing the employee to be repre-
sented by a person of his choosing.80 
Many of these recommendations are actually easier to implement in a 
unionized workplace.  In a unionized workplace, for example, the informal 
grievance procedures preceding arbitration generally result in substantial dis-
covery.81  In addition, most unions and employers already favor written opin-
ions, even in ordinary contractual disputes.82  Increasing the number of written 
opinions will further assist the arbitrators by establishing a body of precedent 
for use in deciding future claims.83  Finally, since the union generally covers the 
costs of arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, the cost-sharing 
suggestion (which some courts might mandate) has already been satisfied. 
Some of the other recommendations, if adopted, would address the criti-
cisms of mandatory arbitration in the unionized workplace.  For example, it is 
suggested that the parties jointly select a neutral arbitrator with knowledge of 
the law.  These arbitrators should undergo special training so that they are 
competent to handle the substantive and procedural issues that arise in 
employment discrimination cases.  Another suggestion is for judicial review of 
 
 79. Carson v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331-32 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 80. Gina K. Janeiro, Balancing Efficiency and Justice: In Support of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission’s Policy Statement Regarding Mandatory Arbitration and Employment Con-
tracts, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 125, 145-47 (1999) (outlining the recommendations of 
organizations specializing in arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution). 
 81. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 217-20 (1997); see 
Mark Zinny, Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes under Collective Bargaining Agreements, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 175, 177 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1997) 
(concluding that the amount of discovery necessary in arbitration pursuant to a CBA should be far less 
than in the nonunion context because the union has the right under the NLRA to access information 
during the grievance procedure, but arguing that more discovery is needed when the employee retains 
outside counsel or when the case involves a disparate impact claim). 
 82. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 81, at 384. 
 83. Zinny, supra note 81, at 178. 
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the disputed legal issues.  If adopted, these policies should calm fears that an 
arbitrator accustomed to dealing only with contractual issues will misapply the 
employment discrimination laws.84 
These organizations have also suggested that any mandatory arbitration 
procedure provide remedies equal to those provided by the law.  This safeguard 
is necessary for arbitration procedures contained in a CBA because the tradi-
tional remedy under a CBA for the wrongful discharge of an employee is for 
reinstatement—with or without back pay—but not for general damages.85  In 
comparison, an employee prevailing on a Title VII claim is entitled to compen-
satory damages, and in the case of malicious discrimination, punitive damages 
as well.86 
C. Additional Precautions Unique to the Collective Bargaining Context 
To satisfy the concerns raised in both the cases and commentary, employers 
of unionized workers should propose a few additional procedures when negoti-
ating arbitration agreements.  These procedures would address those factors 
that currently prevent the complete collapse of Gardner-Denver.87 
The Gardner-Denver Court’s first concern with CBA-mandated arbitration 
was employees’ ignorance that their union may be negotiating away some of 
their statutory rights.88  A relatively simple solution to this problem is to require 
the union to inform the employees of the arbitration policy before ratification 
of the contract. 
The Court’s second concern was that arbitration procedures do not provide 
union employees with the same procedural safeguards they would have in 
 
 84. The National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) has promulgated specific guidelines for arbitra-
tors handling mandatory employment arbitrations.  See NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES 
ON ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYER-PROMULGATED SYSTEMS (May 21, 
1997), at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/alliance/resources/Guide/statement_guidelines 
_of_NAA.html.  It suggests that arbitrators first consider whether they should even take a particular 
case.  Questions that the arbitrator should ask himself include: Do I have a conflict of interest that 
should be disclosed?  Do the parties have adequate rights of representation?  Was I selected in a fair 
manner?  Am I satisfied that I can serve in light of the employment documents and agency laws gov-
erning the dispute?  Am I empowered to provide remedies consistent with the statute?  Am I satisfied 
that the compensation arrangement is consistent with fairness and impartiality?  Once an arbitrator 
accepts a case, the NAA recommends that he identify and resolve issues regarding the conduct of the 
hearing.  Some key issues involve the production of evidence, the extent of discovery, the parties’ 
access to documents, and the schedule for exchanging and submitting evidence.  Another issue to be 
resolved is which rules of evidence apply—federal, state, or informal.  The NAA suggests that arbitra-
tors “seek a comfortable balance between the traditional informality and efficiency of arbitration and 
court-like diligence in respecting and safeguarding the substantive, statutory rights of the parties” and 
“be mindful of instances where application of an informal rule would prejudice an underlying substan-
tive right.”  Finally, the NAA advises arbitrators to write detailed opinions reciting findings of fact 
based on material supplied at the hearing, outlining the statutory issues raised, and incorporating the 
jurisprudence of agencies and courts. 
 85. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 81, at 939. 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. §1981a (2000); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1999). 
 87. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 88. Id. at 51-52. 
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court.89  Any arbitration provision in a CBA should specify that procedural limi-
tations, such as time constraints on filing claims, apply only to contractual 
grievances.  The arbitration provision should also outline separate procedures 
for statutory grievances that more closely resemble the procedures used by the 
courts. 
The third concern—an employee’s inability to compel arbitration at the 
hands of the union representative—is the most difficult to resolve.  In the eyes 
of the Court, the ideal procedure would allow the employee to bring his claim 
regardless of the union decision.  The cost of the proceeding would then be the 
responsibility of the employee or the employer, depending on the employee’s 
financial status.  Assuming that a union would agree to such a provision, 
employers should understand that allowing employees to bring their claims to 
arbitration without union consent would almost certainly increase the number 
of arbitrations.  On the other hand, such a policy would not extend union 
employees’ rights beyond the rights of nonunion employees operating under 
individual arbitration agreements. 
A less attractive alternative for employers would be to negotiate for the 
employee to have a choice of a forum for his statutory claim—either arbitration 
or litigation—in return for an agreement to resolve the dispute in that forum 
exclusively.  The EEOC strongly suggests that all employers adopt an arbitra-
tion policy under which the employee chooses the forum after the dispute 
arises.90  While under current law, a union employee may have the option to 
take his claim both to court and to arbitration because of the overlap of con-
tractual and statutory claims,91 such a provision would eliminate the employee’s 
ability to take two bites at the apple.  Employers should not, however, volun-
tarily enact such a provision, since, by doing so, they would forfeit much of the 
benefits of arbitration.  If arbitration is available but not mandatory, employees 
with small, uncertain claims will choose arbitration, while employees with 
strong cases worth large amounts will choose to litigate.92 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Janeiro, supra note 80, at 145-47. 
 91. Hodges, supra note 51, at 534.  The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) was 
one of the first organizations to require all brokers to sign predispute agreements to arbitrate all dis-
putes with customers and with employers.  While members of the NASD favored arbitrating customer 
disputes, they resisted mandatory arbitration of employment claims.  Consequently, while individual 
employers can still require the arbitration of employment disputes as a condition of employment, the 
NASD no longer requires statutory employment discrimination claims to be arbitrated.  Instead, such 
claims are eligible for arbitration only when the parties agree to arbitrate after the claim has arisen.  
Additionally, for the arbitration of statutory claims, the NASD allows broader discovery, including 
depositions, provides a special roster of arbitrators familiar with employment law disputes, and requires 
arbitrators to state the reasons for their rulings.  See George H. Friedman, Securities Arbitration, 
Today’s Trends, Predictions for Tomorrow, in SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS OF NASD DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 2000, at 135, 140 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1196, 2000). 
 92. By requiring mandatory arbitration, employers accept settling a greater number of minor dis-
putes in exchange for avoiding a major suit that settles for seven figures before a sympathetic jury.  
Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Land Rutkowski, U.S. Supreme Court Decision Gives Life to Manda-
tory Arbitration of Statutory Discrimination Claims in an Employment Setting, 16:4 EMP. L. UPDATE 1, 
8 (2001); see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: 
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D. Bypassing the Union 
An alternative for the employer who does not want to involve the union in 
mandatory arbitration is to bypass the union and impose waivers on employees 
individually.  In most cases, this will be impossible because the employer will be 
prohibited from bypassing the union and negotiating directly with employees, 
even with the employees’ consent, because it undermines collective bargaining.93  
Individual contracts may not be used to defeat or delay collective bargaining.94  
Even though the agreement would be imposed at the time of hire, when the 
employee is not yet a member of the bargaining unit, any individual contract 
that affects the terms and conditions of employment must comply with both the 
National Labor Relations Act and the applicable CBA.95  Additionally, the 
employer may benefit from negotiating with the union because employees may 
be more willing to accept a procedure negotiated by their union represen-
tative.96 
E.  The Unionized Company: Is Mandatory Arbitration Still Worth the 
Trouble? 
While an employer hoping to enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement in 
an individual employment contract might find it beneficial to incorporate provi-
sions discussed above, employers hoping to enforce a mandatory arbitration 
agreement in a CBA will likely find it essential to incorporate such procedures.  
One commentator argues that “the end result . . . would seem to negate the very 
advantages that made arbitration a desirable resolution mechanism in the first 
place.”97  The added procedures certainly will complicate arbitration, but the 
inherent value of arbitration remains. 
Providing limited discovery might slightly increase the costs of arbitration, 
but the altered process would still be much less expensive than litigation.98  Pro-
viding an extended period to file grievances, limited discovery, and judicial 
 
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (discussing employers’ 
rationales for desiring mandatory arbitration). 
Union attorneys who otherwise advocate the use of arbitration in the collective bargaining context 
continue to insist on the necessity of an employee election.  See, e.g., Zinny, supra note 81, at 178.  But 
it is illogical to insist on this election while simultaneously supporting a belief that changes to arbitra-
tion processes, such as increased discovery and judicial review, make arbitration a fair alternative to 
litigation. 
 93. See Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944). 
 94. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944). 
 95. Id. at 335-37.  But see Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. N.W. Airlines, 199 F.3d 477, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(holding that an employer can lawfully impose arbitration agreements on employees individually 
because statutory arbitration is not a mandatory subject of bargaining). 
  96. Hodges, supra note 51, at 534 (advocating that employers try to negotiate arbitration agree-
ments with unions rather than trying to bypass them). 
 97. Wolf, supra note 56, at 269 (arguing that mandatory arbitration should not be used in collective 
bargaining agreements because the changes necessary to make the process fair would destroy the value 
of that process). 
 98. Joshua M. Javits & Francis T. Coleman, High Court to Revisit Issue of Mandatory Arbitration, 
NAT’L L.J., Oct. 5, 1998, at B8. 
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review might prolong the arbitration process, but, once again, arbitration would 
likely remain much faster than litigation.  Judicial review might diminish the 
finality of arbitration, but judicial review would still be much quicker than an 
entirely separate court action, which, as stated previously, is an option for a 
union employee with both statutory and contractual claims.99  And providing for 
written awards would not threaten the confidentiality of arbitration so long as 




If mandatory arbitration of statutory claims is to be permitted in any 
employment context, it should be permitted in the collective bargaining context.  
Union employees have more, not less, power to negotiate a favorable agree-
ment than individual employees, and they are protected by a union that has 
knowledge and skills concerning arbitration that match those of the employer.  
Many of the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co. were at that time also concerns about individual employee 
arbitration agreements.  As the Court recognized in Gilmer, however, the gen-
eralized mistrust of mandatory arbitration evinced in Gardner-Denver has since 
been rejected,101 in part because arbitral processes have matured.  The unique 
concerns that remain over union arbitration—primarily, union employees’ 
unfamiliarity with the provisions in CBAs and unions’ ability to control access 
to arbitration—can be addressed through well-drafted arbitration procedures. 
As two attorneys with experience representing management in labor dis-
putes advise, “mandatory arbitration agreements that focus on a change of 
forum (from judicial to arbitral) rather than attempt to truncate the breadth of 
the laws are more likely to survive judicial scrutiny.”102  Relatively recent prece-
dent established by Austin and Wright, among others, suggests that some courts 
are now willing to consider the fairness of a particular procedure as long as 
employees are fully aware of the rights they have waived.  But not even the 
most progressive court will enforce an arbitration procedure that does not con-
tain the safeguards discussed throughout this Article.  The arbitration process 
that remains after these safeguards are incorporated may be less favorable than 
the process that employers have long championed, but it is still a process pref-
erable to litigation. 
 
 99. St. Antoine, supra note 40, at 501. 
 100. Boyd A. Byers, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 67 J. KAN. B. ASS’N. 18, 20 
(1998). 
 101. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 n.5. 
 102. Cynthia M. Surrisi & Timothy E. Delahunt, Growth of ADR in the Labor and Employment 
Arena and Its Likely Role in the Coming Decade (June 8, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at 
the National Conference on Labor-Management Relations: Labor Law in the Year 2000 and Beyond, 
June 8-9, 2000) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
